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1. Introduction  
 
For most cities that have high air travel demand and an open skies policy, international 
flight markets are highly competitive.  In the Asia Pacific region, such examples can be 
found in Singapore, Hongkong, and Taipei.  In these cities, the popular routes attract a 
large number of air carriers giving a large number of choices for international air 
travellers.  Jou et al. (2005) described a decision model to capture these travellers’ 
decisions in choosing an international air carrier.  In this paper, the focus is on how 
airlines compete with each other to gain market share in the international air travel 
market.  The validation of the model is based on data obtained in Taiwan. 
The international flight market in Taiwan is served by a number of local and 
international airlines (Table 1). The two local carriers, China and EVA Airlines, are the 
dominant airlines and have the largest share of passengers in the international flight 
market (62.9% in total). Another six airlines have the remaining market share. 
 
Table 1:  The passenger distribution between airlines in the international flight market in Taiwan 
Airline Numbers of Passengers Percentage 
China Airlines 952160 32.4% 
EVA Airlines 897186 30.5% 
North-Western 263428 9.0% 
United Airlines 226454 7.7% 
SIA 212237 7.2% 
Canadian Airlines 207162 7.0% 
Malaysian Airlines 127270 4.3% 
Thai Airways 53000 1.8% 
Total 2938897 100.0% 
 Source: Numbers of Passengers are from the data supplied by airline companies     above and tourist 
agencies in Taiwan. 
 
In order to be more competitive, the airlines actively provide a number of competitive 
strategies to expand their own market share. These strategies include incentive pricing, 
convenient flight arrangements, flight safety, and priority services worldwide. How to 
improve their service quality to attract more passengers and expand market share is of 
vital interest for airlines in the highly competitive Taiwan market. 
In this paper, we focus on how changes in service quality of one airline could affect the 
market share of all operators. Service level is measured by a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative measures, identified as influences through a linear structural equation 
model system developed in Jou et al. (2005).  To study the dynamic market processes 
among airlines, game theoretic competition models were set up to understand how the 
changes in service quality of one airline could affect the market share of itself and 
others.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews past studies involving the use of 
game theory in airline competition.  The static and dynamic games used to investigate 
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service competition between the airlines are discussed in Sections 3 and 4.  The results 
of competition are given in Section 5 followed by conclusions and suggestions for 
further research in Section 6.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There are a growing number of transport applications of game theory in the 
context of airport landing fees (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977), merging 
behaviour on freeways (Kita et al., 2001), how jurisdictions choose to finance 
their roads (Levinson, 1999, 2000, 2005), aviation (Hansen and Wenbei, 2001), 
and the political acceptability of road pricing (Marini and Marcucci, 2003). We 
highlight three studies that relate to airlines. 
 
The international flight market in Taiwan is essentially an oligopoly and thus it 
is appropriate to apply game theory to analyze the reactions between airline 
companies if one of them adopts a specific competitive strategy. Game theory is 
traditionally used to analyze decision behaviour in the presence of interactions 
and dynamics between a number of competing parties.  
 
Hansen (1990) studied competition between direct air flight and hub-based 
operations with the use of non-cooperative game theory and an assumption of a 
single fare structure. Competitive strategies in flight scheduling designed to 
maximize profits were analyzed. The market share, operation cost models and 
demand models of direct flight and hub-based operations of airlines were 
established. It was assumed that the flight schedules of competing airlines were 
known and airlines scheduled their flights to maximize profits. The results 
showed that if the hub can be operated at a lower cost, with less delays and 
easier transfers, then the market share of the hub-based airlines would increase. 
It was suggested that the predictive power would increase if traveller 
preferences, specific aircraft features and the economic behaviour of the 
airlines were included. 
 
Zubieta (1998) studied competition in levels of service among private bus 
operators, in an oligopoly environment. It was assumed that private bus 
companies operate their own fixed routes and compete on levels of service. The 
bus operator’s objective was to maximize profits whereas passengers 
emphasised shortest travel time paths, establishing a Nash equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium needs to satisfy two conditions: (i) no private bus operators can 
increase their profits by unilaterally changing any of their routes, and (ii) no 
passengers can shorten their travel times by unilaterally changing their choice 
of operators and routes. The model was tested on a small road network (29 
nodes, 86 links and 8 bus routes), with bus fares fixed at a flat fee of $1. The 
test results indicated that this games-based model realistically described the 
behaviour of private bus operators and passengers. 
 
Hansen and Kanafani (1990) investigated airport capacity problems at Tokyo-
Narita airport. An airline network competition model suitable for Asian 
conditions was developed. Assuming equilibrium under Cournot, a different 
network configuration and hub location, and how the airport related to the 
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profit maximization of airlines, results indicated that Tokyo-Narita’s 
passenger/airline market share would reduce if the capacity problem was solved 
through the expansion of facilities. The market share could drop by 50% if 
airport costs increased by 40% since this would increase the airlines’ costs and 
would prompt the airlines to use other hubs. As a result, the profits for the 
airport as a whole would reduce. 
 
3. Profit and Cost Functions  
 
In oligopolistic game theory, the competitive behaviour between individual 
firms can be divided into two categories: Nash and Stakelberg price competition 
and Cournot and Stakelberg quantity competition1. Our focus is on the service 
quality of each airline; and we investigate airline competitive behaviour in 
terms of service quality strategies. Assuming an equilibrium process underlying 
competitive behaviour, we use Cournot’s model to represent the way firms 
compete on service quality, and Bertrand’s model to represent price 
competition. In the Cournot model, airlines are assumed to select a level of 
service quality that maximizes their own profits under the assumption that other 
firms would not change their service quality at the same time. The assumptions 
in a Bertrand model are similar; however the airlines will choose their price 
levels in response to any unilateral change in price by one of the airlines.  A 
Stakelberg model is used to describe dynamic competition because the 
dominant firm in the industry would most likely adjust its competitive 
behaviour according to its prediction of how other small firms react to the 
strategies taken to achieve the maximum level of profit.   
 
In formulating the profit and cost functions of each style of competition the 
following assumptions are made.  First, we focus on competition in service 
quality and price between airlines excluding competition in numbers of flights 
and routes.  Second, we assume that the games are non-cooperative and played 
under perfect information.  Third, in the Bertrand and Cournot models, the 
firms are homogenous and similar in size; but in the Stakelberg model, the 
larger firms are the “leaders”, and the rest are “followers”.   
 
3.1 The Profit Function 
 
The profit function (equation 1) of an airline is the total revenue received by 
providing the service minus the total cost needed to run the company and to 
supply products to passengers within a given time period.  
 
iiii CWTP −=π  (1) 
 where iπ = profit of airline i  (dollars/year); 
iW = ticket price of airline i  (dollars/time); 
                                                          
1 A brief definition of Cournot, Stakelberg and Bertrand methods is given in Appendix A.  
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T  = total demand in international flight market (passengers/year); 
iP = market share of airline i  in international flight market; 
iC = total cost of airline i  (dollars/year). 
 
and iP T W is the revenue of airline i.  
 
3.2 The Cost Function 
 
Given the difficulties in obtaining detailed cost information from airlines, the 
estimating method proposed by Kane (1990) was used to calculate operating 
costs (equation 2). Kane defined the cost of every flight as cost in unit distance 
plus the unit cost of service quality a passenger perceived. 
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where  iC =  total cost ($/year) of airline i ; 
pqiB , = unit operating cost (dollar/kilometre-flight) from starting 
point p  to destination q  of airline i ; 
iS =   number (times/year) of international flights for 
airline i ; 
pqiM , = distance (km) between starting point p  and destination q  of 
airline i ; 
il =  unit cost (dollar/time) of service quality a passenger 
perceived from airline i ; 
ikQ = the k
th service quality measure of airline i ; 
iR =  total passengers (passengers/year) of airline i  in a year  
iP =  market share (%) of airline i  in the international flight 
market 
 
3.3 Objective Function  
 
The objective function incorporating the service quality and price level an airline needs 
to set is the first order condition from the profit function with respect to each choice 
variable iW  and ikQ  depending on whether other firms’ prices or service quality 
levels are known.  
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Equation (4) represents the reaction of airline i  after other airlines have 
decided their service quality levels. The partial derivative of P with respect to 
Q in equation (4) can be obtained through the direct elasticity of a demand or 
choice model. A similar expression is given in equation (5). 
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In equations (1) to (5), the market share Pi is derived from an airline choice 
model reported in Jou et al. (2005). The partial derivative of P with respect to 
W in equation (5) can also be obtained through the direct elasticity of a choice 
model (Hensher et al. 2005). 
 
4. Competitions between Airlines  
 
The basic models of Stakelberg, Cournot, and Bertrand only describe 
competition between airlines in a duopoly. In Cournot and Bertrand models the 
size of airlines in the market are the same. But in the Stakelberg model, there is 
a dominating big airline and another small one in the market. A market 
containing two airlines only is not representative of the actual international 
airline market in Taiwan (Table 1). Therefore, we need to expand the number of 
players in the models to represent the real market conditions of interest.  
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4.1 Static Service Quality Competition 
 
The most important assumption of the Cournot model is that an airline 
determines the optimal service quality level while the service quality of other 
airlines is taken as given.  Such is called a static model. In this paper, the 
procedure to determine the optimal condition of each firm is as follows: 
 
Step 1: construct the profit function of each airline using equation (3) and 
incorporate the estimated parameters from the discrete choice model, 
i.e. average price, total passenger numbers, and annual flight numbers 
of an airline;  
Step 2: calculate the first order conditions of each airline’s profit function to 
find the reaction functions respectively, as shown in equation (4). The 
market share Pa would now be the probability of airline a in the 
multinomial logot (MNL) choice model; and 
Step 3: determine the optimal service quality level of each airline by solving 
the reaction functions of all airlines simultaneously. 
 
4.2 Static Price Competition 
 
Instead of focusing on competition based service quality levels between airlines 
in a Cournot model, a Bertrand competition model emphasizes the competition 
of prices between airlines, who would set their own optimal prices to maximize 
their profit simultaneously, given other airlines’ prices remain unchanged. The 
procedures to determine the optimal conditions are quite similar to the Cournot 
model (static service quality competition), the difference is that the choice 
variable is replaced by price. 
 
Step 1: construct the profit function of each airline using equation (3) and 
incorporate the estimated parameters from the MNL choice model, i.e. 
average price, total numbers of passengers, and annual numbers of 
flights of an airline;  
Step 2: calculate the first order conditions of each airline’s profit function to 
determine the reaction functions respectively, as shown in equation 
(5). The market share Pa is the probability of firm a in the MNL 
model; and 
Step 3: determine the optimal price level of each airline by solving the 
reaction functions of all firms simultaneously. 
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4.3 Dynamic Competitions 
 
Based on a dynamic game like Stakelberg’s model, the airlines do not act at the same 
time. The dominant one (or the leader) first sets a service quality (or price) level and the 
other small airlines (or followers) choose their optimal competition strategies according 
to this level. The leading airline then chooses its optimal service quality level to 
maximize its profit according to the followers’ reactions to the level it sets. The detailed 
competition procedure in this Stakelberg’s model is as follows:  
 
Step 1: construct the profit function of each airline using equation (3) and 
incorporate the estimated parameters from the MNL choice model, i.e. 
average price, total numbers of passengers, and annual numbers of 
flights;  
Step 2: take the actual values of average prices, service quality, and social-
economic characteristics of passengers into the MNL choice model to 
determine the market share of each airline; set the airline with the 
highest market share to be the leading airline, the second highest one 
to be the first follower, the third highest one to be the second follower 
and so on;  
Step 3: incorporate the original service quality levels of the leading firm, 
second, third airline etc. and the final followers into the profit 
function of the first follower and determine the optimal condition 
(profit maximization, first order condition) of the first follower on 
service quality.  With this procedure, we can identify the reaction 
function on service quality of the first follower; 
Step 4: incorporate the original service quality of leading firm, third follower 
etc. up to the final follower, and the optimal service quality level of 
the first follower calculated from step 3 into the profit function of the 
second follower. Determine its optimal level of service quality from 
the first order conditions of its profit function; by this procedure, we 
can obtain the reaction function on service quality of the second 
follower; 
Step 5: repeat step 3 to calculate the optimal level of service quality of the 
third to final follower; thus the reaction functions of all other 
followers, except the first and second ones, can be obtained; 
Step 6: incorporate all the reaction functions of the followers into the profit 
function for the leading airline and calculate the optimal level of its 
service quality; 
Step 7: given the service level obtained in step 6, repeat steps 3~5 to find out the 
service quality level of all followers under the profit maximization condition; 
and 
Step 8: verify the convergent possibility of each airline’s service quality level under 
profit maximization conditions; if possible, the convergent value is the 
optimal service quality level under Stakelberg competition; otherwise, repeat 
steps 6 and 7 until the values converge. 
The Effect of Service Quality and Price on International Airline Competition 
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5. The Empirical Setting  
 
Over the period May to June 2001, a sample of passengers whose first or last 
landing destination was North America, the most popular (> 50%) destination 
for passengers originated from Taiwan, were interviewed. The sample was 
stratified random based on the shares of each airline in this market segment 
(Table 2). An effective sample of 602 (out of the 702 interviews) was obtained 
who completed all the questions on their trip, their socioeconomic background 
and a series of attitudinal questions that measure their degrees of satisfaction 
with the airlines they used. 
 
Table 2:  Sample Distribution of Each Airline Company 
Airline Numbers of Passenger* Ratio 
Sample 
Number 
Useful Sample 
Number ** 
Ratio 
(Sample) 
China 952160 32.4% 272 225 32.1% 
EVA 897186 30.5% 256 216 30.8% 
North-West 263428 9.0% 76 63 9.0% 
United 226454 7.7% 65 53 7.5% 
Singapore 212237 7.2% 61 52 7.4% 
Canada 207162 7.0% 59 49 7.0% 
Malaysia 127270 4.3% 36 30 4.3% 
Thailand 53000 1.8% 15 14 2.0% 
Total 2938897 100.0% 810 702 100.0% 
Note: 
* Numbers of Passenger comes from the data supplied by individual airlines and tourist 
agencies in Taiwan. 
** The Useful Sample Number is on the basis of usable sample number after excluding out 
the samples which the answers in social-economic part in the survey is not clear or not 
satisfy our basic requirements. 
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Table 3:  Service Indices and their Grades by Airlines 
Indices of Service Quality Aspects of Service CA Eva FC 
Comprehensiveness of services and comfort of seat Comfort 3.26 3.56 3.42 
Design and cleanliness of passenger compartment Comfort 3.51 3.71 3.63 
Entertainment programs Comfort 3.35 3.60 3.45 
Appearance, manner, attitude, and service efficiency 
of air hostess or steward  
Service Attitude 3.62 3.67 3.67 
Quality of food and drinks Service Comprehensiveness 3.44 3.42 3.36 
Reputation in flight safety  Safety 3.01 3.96 3.90 
Ease of purchasing tickets  Convenience 3.62 3.79 3.80 
Number of flights Convenience 3.61 3.66 3.63 
Convenience of flight times Convenience ,  Service Comprehensiveness 3.55 3.65 3.58 
Baggage handling Convenience 3.58 3.69 3.60 
Attitude of ground personnel on incident Professional Capability 3.32 3.46 3.49 
Attitude of the flight crew on incident Professional Capability, Safety 3.36 3.52 3.51 
Level of language ability Professional Capability,  Convenience 3.54 3.53 3.69 
Complimentary gifts  Service Comprehensiveness 3.08 3.08 3.02 
Frequent flight program Service Comprehensiveness 3.43 3.43 3.49 
In-flight supplies  Service Comprehensiveness,  Convenience 3.30 3.38 3.17 
In-flight duty-free merchandising  Service Comprehensiveness,  
Convenience 3.29 3.32 3.24 
Note: The numbers are the average values of each index.  
 
The degree of satisfaction on each index clustered around 3 grades. The index with the 
lowest grade is the “Complimentary gifts”, from 3.02 of FC to 3.08 of CA and EV.  The 
grades of index “Attitude of ground personnel on incident” on three airlines is rather 
low as well. As for the “Design and cleanliness of passenger compartment”, 
“Appearance”, “Manner”, “Attitude”, and “Service efficiency of air hostess or steward”, 
“Ease of purchasing tickets”, “Number of flights”, “Convenience of flight times”, 
“Baggage handling”, and “Level of language ability”, the grades of all three airlines in 
these indices are higher than 3.50 points.  
 
6. Analysis of Competitions between Airlines  
 
In section 4, we have indicated that there are “leaders” and “followers” in the 
Stakelberg competition model, but not in the Bertrand and Cournot models. In 
the current study, we define the leader in the international flight market in 
Taiwan as the airline with the biggest market share, and the followers as the 
other airlines. Airlines compete with each other through price and service 
quality, such as safety, convenience, and comprehensiveness, assuming that the 
total market demand stays constant after competition. Price and service quality, 
including safety, convenience, and comprehensiveness are included in objective 
functions above based on the empirical evidence in the choice models in Jou et 
al. (2005) (Appendix B is the estimation results of choice model). The input 
data for the models are presented in Table 4. 
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6.1 Competition on Safety  
 
We firstly focus on the competition in standards of safety. The results are shown in 
Table 5 based on information given in Table 4. For the market as a whole, profit 
decreases with enhanced levels of competition in safety, regardless of whether there is 
static or dynamic competition.  For the effects on an individual airline, CA and EV 
would benefit in terms of market demand and profit from static competition on safety, 
where FC would be the loser. In contrast, FC and CA would benefit in terms of safety 
from dynamic competition and gain greater market share and profit. Only EV will 
dramatically lose its market demand and profit under dynamic competition. The 
advantages from dynamic competition of FC and CA may result from their dominant 
positions in the market. 
 
Table 4:  The Input Data for the Competition Models 
 
Items CA EVA FC 
Fixed operation costs (NT$) 10,067,217,053 10,662,466,437 24,057,342,058 
 Unit cost of service 
quality a passenger 
perceived (NT$) 
45.016 48.681 38.979 Cost function 
Air Ticket(NT$) 29,733 30,752 30,573 
Price (NT$) 31,250 31,550 31,500 
Safety (Grades) 2.142 2.678 2.877 
Convenience (Grades) 3.315 2.711 2.106 
Reference 
point 
Comprehensiveness 
(Grades) 2.816 3.377 3.048 
Safety LOSS  -0.162 -0.138 -0.167 
Convenience GAIN  0.575 0.269 0.174 Service quality 
Comprehensiveness LOSS  -0.206 -0.097 -0.108 
Note: 
1.Reference point of price was obtained from travel agents (average price) in 2001.  
2.Reference points of service quality were obtained from the estimation results  
  of LISREL.  
3.Service quality GAIN and LOSS were obtained by calculating the average of the difference 
between the samples and reference point. 
4.Air ticket was calculated from the average ticket of all samples.  
5.Unit cost of service quality a passenger perceived=service cost of airline  
company/(passengers x total grades of service quality)  
6.1 US$ is approximately 34.97 NT$. 
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6.2 Competitions on Convenience 
 
For competition linked to convenience, the profit of the total market would decrease in 
static competition and increase under dynamic competition, according to the results 
shown in Table 6.This increased profit of the total market from dynamic competition 
should contribute to exceptional profit growth of FC, at the expense of profits for CA, 
which would become negative. Although the profit of CA would also decrease under 
static competition, the magnitude is not as under the dynamic condition. The profit of 
EV would decrease when competing on convenience under both the static and dynamic 
conditions. This phenomenon is contrary to the competitive result of profits for FC, 
whose profits would increase after increases in convenience, especially under dynamic 
competition. The market share of each airline also changes dramatically. The market 
share of CA would increase slightly under static competition, but decrease immensely 
under the dynamic condition. The rise of convenience in EV would cause losses in 
market share in all forms of competition, which is contrary to the results for FC. 
Overall, FC would receive the most benefit from competition in convenience. 
 
Table 5:  The Results of Competition in Safety Levels 
 
Company Competition Safety Degree (Grades) 
Market Share 
(%) 
Market Demand 
(Persons) 
Profit 
(NT Dollar*) 
Original 1.98 31.22% 917,418 16,434,561,905 
Static 2.12 33.37% 980,847 18,251,515,893 CA 
Dynamic 2.14 31.53% 926,758 16,697,616,660 
Original 2.54 33.92% 996,837 19,044,880,657 
Static 2.65 34.29% 1,007,697 19,358,284,868 EV 
Dynamic 2.68 32.96% 968,528 18,194,713,762 
Original 2.71 34.86% 1,024,641 6,537,880,892 
Static 2.77 32.34% 950,353 4,331,778,751 FC  
Dynamic 2.88 35.51% 1,043,611 7,097,517,768 
Original -- 100% 2,938,897 42,017,323,454 
Static -- 100% 2,938,897 41,941,579,512 Total Market 
Dynamic -- 100% 2,938,897 41,989,848,190 
*:1 US$ is approximately 34.97 NT$. 
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Table 6:  The Results of Competition in Convenience Levels 
 
Company Competition Convenience Degree(Grades) 
Market Share 
(%) 
Market Demand 
(Number) 
Profit 
(NT Dollar) 
Origin 3.89 31.22% 917,418 16,609,660,721 
Static 4.012 31.43% 923,835 16,434,561,905 CA 
Dynamic 5.000 10.64% 312,573 -1,053,421,362 
Origin 2.98 33.92% 996,837 19,044,880,657 
Static 3.009 31.08% 913,368 16,564,080,275 EV 
Dynamic 5.000 28.97% 851,469 14,628,944,694 
Origin 2.28 34.86% 1,024,641 6,537,880,892 
Static 2.467 37.49% 1,101,694 8,827,939,875 FC 
Dynamic 5.000 60.39% 1,774,854 22,212,763,123 
Origin -- 100% 2,938,897 42,017,323,454 
Static -- 100% 2,938,897 42,001,680,871 Total Market 
Dynamic  100% 2,938,897 42,326,167,346 
 
6.3 Competition in Service Comprehensiveness (or Quality 
diversification) 
 
As shown in Table 7, total market profit would decrease under static and dynamic 
competition of service quality diversification. For CA, its profits would increase in both 
forms of competition, resulting in expansion of market share, producing a greater 
increase under static than under dynamic competition.  But this is not the case for EV 
and FC, who would find their profits decreasing under both forms of competition. Their 
market share would shrink as well and only CA would benefit from competition in 
levels of service quality under either static or dynamic competition. 
 
Table 7:  The Results of Competition in Service Comprehensiveness 
 
Company Competition Levels of Convenience(Grades) 
Market Share 
(%) 
Market Demand 
(Persons) 
Profit 
(NT Dollar) 
Origin 2.61 31.22% 917,418 16,434,561,905 
Static 2.76 33.31% 978,959 18,201,328,006 CA 
Dynamic 2.82 33.05% 971,212 17,968,198,653 
Origin 3.28 33.92% 996,837 19,044,880,657 
Static 3.32 33.25% 977,152 18,458,627,777 EV 
Dynamic 3.38 32.87% 965,910 18,125,563,945 
Origin 2.94 34.86% 1,024,641 6,537,880,892 
Static 2.95 33.44% 982,786 5,289,912,218 FC 
Dynamic 3.05 34.09% 1,001,774 5,855,642,390 
Origin -- 100% 2,938,897 42,017,323,454 
Static -- 100% 2,938,897 41,949,868,001 Total Market 
Dynamic -- 100% 2,938,897 41,949,404,988 
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6.4 Static Price Competition  
 
In section 4.1, for static price competition, airlines choose their optimal prices 
simultaneously while others’ prices are fixed. Results in the international airline market 
under such competition are shown in Table 8. Assuming fixed market demand, total 
market profits decrease after competing on price. The equilibrium prices of all 
three airlines also decrease. CA lowered its price much more than EV and FC.  
 
By this price cutting competition, CA gains in market share and profits. For EV 
and FC, although they also lower their prices under Bertrand competition, their 
market shares and profits still decrease. This might be because their amount of 
price-cutting is less than CA’s, which indicates that CA benefits from this price 
competition. Finally, the percentage of profit change in the whole market in 
Bertrand competition (5.77%) is greater than that in the competition on the 
three aspects of service quality (0.18% in safety, 0.04% in convenience, and 
0.16% in diversification).  
 
 
Table 8:  The Results of Static Competition in Price 
 
Company Situations Price (NT dollar) 
Market Share
(%) 
Market Demand 
(Persons) 
Profit 
(NT Dollar) 
After Competition 28758 35.01% 1,028,808 18,649,140,126 
Before Competition 29733 31.22% 917,418 16,434,561,905 CA 
Comparison -975 3.79% 111,390 2,214,578,221 
After Competition 30035 32.60% 958,160 17,204,928,694 
Before Competition 30752 33.92% 996,837 19,044,880,657 EV 
Comparison -717 -1.32% -38,678 -1,839,951,963 
After Competition 29913 32.39% 951,929 3,738,078,198 
Before Competition 30573 34.86% 1,024,641 6,537,880,892 FC 
Comparison -660 -2.47% -72,713 -2,799,802,694 
After Competition -- 100% 2,938,897 39,592,147,017 
Before Competition -- 100% 2,938,897 42,017,323,454 Total Market 
Comparison -- 0 0 -2,425,176,437 
 
6.5 Dynamic Price Competition 
 
Under dynamic price competition, airlines observe each others’ price to adjust 
theirs to maximize their own profits. Through price competition, airlines may 
need to lower their prices continuously until their objectives are met. In the 
following, we discuss the situation until the profit of one firm becomes zero. 
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the estimated results of ticket prices, market shares, 
firm profits, and market-level profit. 
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Figure 1:  Changes in Prices under Dynamic Price Competition 
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Figure 2:  Changes in Market Share as Ticket Prices are Cut 
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
0 5 10 15 20 25rounds
profits
(10 million
NT dollar)
China Air Eva Air FC Air
 
Figure 3:  Changes in Airline Profits 
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Figure 4:  Change of International Flight Market Profits 
 
Figure 1 clearly shows that the price that each airline would need to 
continuously reduce in the quest for gains in market shares from of price-
cutting. Prices of CA are always the lowest. But in the case of EV, its prices are 
the highest all the time, and thus contribute to its lowest market share (Figure 
2), which also shows that FC would gain the highest share of the market under 
dynamic price competition, even though its price in Figure 1 is not the lowest. 
Finally, in Figure 2, the lines of market share of CA and EV intercept in the 
second round of competition. This means that, from competition round 2, the 
market share of EV would be lower than CA’s in the following rounds.  
 
The profit changes in the international flight market under dynamic competition 
are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Firstly, the profits of all three firms decrease 
gradually through the rounds of competition (Figure 3).  A similar pattern can 
be found for profits in the international flight market in Figure 4. Secondly, the 
profit of FC remains the lowest throughout the competitive process and turns 
negative after round 21. Finally, the profits in the first round of CA are lower 
than that of EV. However this is reversed after the second round. Overall, CA, 
the leader, earns more profit by adopting a price-cutting strategy than the other 
two airlines. By this strategy, FC is forced to reduce its price continuously. 
Although this strategy helps it to earn more market share, this is not the case of 
its profit. FC runs into losses after competition round 21. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The effects of static and dynamic competition on service quality and price between 
firms in the international flight market in Taiwan were investigated through a game-
based simulation. In these games, which are duopoly based, the leading firm is CA with 
two major followers EV and FC. Static competition results show that CA would benefit 
more than the other two firms from safety and service quality enhancements. Its profits 
would increase 10.78% and 10.46% respectively. FC would benefit more from static 
competition when service convenience is improved, with its profit increasing by 
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31.57%. As for the static price competition, the total profit of the market as a 
whole would decrease significantly. CA would need to reduce its price more 
than the other airlines to stay competitive, earning more market share than 
before as a result. Under dynamic competition, FC would benefit more than the 
other airlines from competition on safety and convenience due to its profit 
being the highest. On the other hand, CA would be more profitable than the 
other airlines from dynamic competition based on service quality 
comprehensiveness. FC is the clear champion under dynamic competition and 
benefits more than under the static case, thus implying the leader’s advantage. 
Under dynamic price competition, in spite of FC having the advantage of being 
a leader, continuous price cutting would result in a loss for airlines as 
competition heightens. 
 
Based on the findings discussed in this paper, a passenger considers not only the price, 
but also the service quality when choosing an airline. For an airline to attract more 
passengers, the safety aspect of service quality, in particular, should be improved. 
Convenience of service quality is also important in a passenger’s choice of airline. This 
implies that the airlines should improve the various aspects of convenience, e.g. ease in 
purchasing tickets, baggage handling, or flight times, etc. Passengers would prefer 
receiving comprehensive service, for example - frequent flyer programs, better food and 
drinks, in-flight supplies, or duty-free merchandise, etc.; all effective strategies to win 
more passengers.   
 
In this study, the sample has insufficient passengers travelling first-class and business 
class to have enough information to separately analyze their service quality 
requirements. Given the keen competition between airlines, the formation of airline 
alliances has become a popular strategic instrument to expand their own markets. Thus, 
further research should focus on the formation process of the alliances and their effects 
on service quality of airlines. 
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Appendix A :  A brief definition of Cournot, Stakelberg 
and Bertrand methods (From Wikipedia, the free 
encyclopedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page) 
 
Cournot competition is a model used to describe industry structure. It so called after 
Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) after he observed competition in a spring water 
duopoly. It has the following features: 
 
1. There are two firms producing homogeneous products;  
2. Firms do not cooperate.  
3. Firms have market power;  
4. There are barriers to entry;  
5. Firms compete in quantities, and choose quantities simultaneously;  
6. There is strategic behaviour by the firms;  
 
Price is a commonly known decreasing function of total output. All firms know N and 
take the output of the others as given. Each firm has a cost function ci(qi) (cost per unit 
multiply quantity). Normally the cost functions are treated as common knowledge. The 
cost functions are normally the same for all firms. The market price is set at a level such 
that demand equals the total quantity produced by both firms. 
 
The Stackelberg leadership model is a model of duopoly in economics. It is named after 
the German economist Heinrich von Stackelberg who published Marktform und 
Gleichgewicht in 1934 which described the model. In game theory terms, the players of 
this game are a leader and a follower and they compete on quantity. The leader moves 
first, choosing a quantity. The follower observes the leader's choice and then picks a 
quantity. There are some further constraints upon the sustaining of a Stackelberg 
equilibrium. The leader must know ex ante that the follower observes his action. The 
follower must have no means of committing to a future non-Stackelberg follower action 
and the leader must know this. Indeed, if the 'follower' could commit to a Stackelberg 
leader action and the 'leader' knew this; the leader's best response would be to play a 
Stackelberg follower action. Firms may engage in Stackelberg competition if one has 
some sort of advantage enabling it to move first. More generally, the leader must have 
commitment power. Moving observably first is the most obvious means of 
commitment: once the leader has made its move, it cannot undo it - it is committed to 
that action. Moving first may be possible if the leader was the incumbent monopoly of 
the industry and the follower is a new entrant. Holding excess capacity is another means 
of commitment 
 
Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics, named after Joseph 
Louis François Bertrand (1822-1900). Specifically, it is a model of price competition 
between duopoly firms which results in each charging the price that would be charged 
under perfect competition, known as marginal cost pricing. 
 
The model has the following assumptions: 
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1. There are two firms producing homogeneous products;  
2. Firms do not cooperate;  
3. Firms have the same marginal cost (MC);  
4. Marginal cost is constant;  
5. Demand is linear;  
6. Firms compete in price, and choose their respective prices simultaneously;  
7. There is strategic behaviour by both firms;  
8. Both firms compete solely on price and then supply the quantity demanded;  
9. Consumers buy everything from the cheaper firm or half at each, if the price is 
equal.  
 
Competing in price means that firms can easily change the quantity they supply, but 
once they have chosen a certain price, it is very hard, if not impossible, to change it, for 
example bars or shops or other companies that publish non-negotiable prices. 
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Appendix B:  Estimation results of the choice model 
(Jou et al., 2005) 
 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients (t values) 
Constant of EV 0.695(2.37) 
Constant of FC 1.579(2.96) 
Frequency of going abroad (FC) -0.368(-2.67) 
WGAIN (price) 0.000543(2.27) 
3QLOSS (safety) 1.643(2.81) 
4QGAIN (convenience) 1.01(4.54) 
6QLOSS (diversification) 0.806(2.21) 
LL (0) -293.3295 
LL( β∧ ) -172.640 
2ρ  0.411 
2ρ  0.399 
sample size 267 
 
